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Abstract  
The impact of a corporate governance system on economic efficiency, with a strong emphasis on shareholders' 
welfare is encouraged. In large firms where there is a separation of ownership and management and no 
controlling shareholders, the activities of the company be it public or private entity are governed by the ethics of  
good and corporate governance to boost investors interest. Corporate scandals of various forms have maintained 
public and political interest in the regulation of corporate governance. This paper will examine the legal regime 
of corporate governance and sound ethical principles on some of the regulatory agencies in Nigeria that control 
the economy with the provision of code of conduct as best practices in corporate world. The paper recommends 
that SEC, CAC, CAMA and other regulatory agencies in our business environment should administer good 
corporate governance’s codes to have the confident of its customers, investors and shareholders as obtainable in 
other jurisdictions to avoid the reoccurrence of a disastrous social impacts seen in the last decade of global 
financial crisis.. 
Keyword: Corporate Governance, Legal Framework, Code of Conduct, Regulatory and Management, Public 
and private Entities.   
  
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance refers to the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. The governance 
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation 
(such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders) 
and specifies the rules and procedures for making decisions in corporate affairs. Governance provides the 
structure through which corporations set and pursue their objectives, while reflecting the context of the social, 
regulatory and market environment. Governance is a mechanism for monitoring the actions, policies and 
decisions of corporations. Governance involves the alignment of interests among the stakeholders.  
Corporate governance has also been defined as "a system of law and sound approaches by which corporations 
are directed and controlled focusing on the internal and external corporate structures with the intention of 
monitoring the actions of management and directors and thereby mitigating agency risks which may stem from 
the misdeeds of corporate officers.  
Corporate governance can also be defined as "the set of conditions that shapes the ex post bargaining over the 
quasi-rents generated by a firm. The firm itself is modelled as a governance structure acting through the 
mechanisms of contract. Here corporate governance may include its relation to corporate finance. 
In contemporary business corporations, the main external stakeholder groups are shareholders, debt holders, 
trade creditors, suppliers, customers and communities affected by the corporation's activities. Internal 
stakeholders are the board of directors, executives, and other employees. 
There has been renewed interest in the corporate governance practices of modern corporations, particularly in 
relation to accountability, since the high-profile collapses of a number of large corporations during 2001–2002, 
most of which involved accounting fraud. Corporate scandals of various forms have maintained public and 
political interest in the regulation of corporate governance. In the U.S., these include Enron Corporation and 
MCI Inc. (formerly WorldCom). Their demise is associated with the U.S. federal government passing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, intending to restore public confidence in corporate governance. Comparable 
failures in Australia (HIH, One.Tel) are associated with the eventual passage of the CLERP 9 reforms. Similar 
corporate failures in other countries stimulated increased regulatory interest (e.g., Parmalat in Italy). 
2. Corporate Governance in Nigeria. 
The dominant influence of corporate governance principles in corporate administration is beyond question. The 
pervasive influence of corporate governance principles has been largely attributable to the adverse consequences 
of non-compliance with provisions of corporate governance codes; Nigeria is no exception in the implementation 
of corporate governance codes. The global financial crisis and the ensuring spotlight of media and public 
attention have changed that for the long term. This is made manifest by the fact that there exists in Nigeria a 
multiplicity of corporate governance codes; some of which are industry specific. In the implementation of 
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corporate governance principles, some crucial matters are either being overlooked or ignored. This paper, while 
highlighting the legal framework for corporate governance in Nigeria and the benefits of adherence to sound 
corporate governance principles, points out some inherent shortcomings of the corporate governance regime in 
the country. The regulators have shown no sign of abating their determination to be seen raising standards. The 
investment community or sectors are now assured of the compliance of good corporate practices by the 
regulatory bodies and agencies that monitor these entities be it in the public or private sectors environment. 
The importance of corporate governance in corporate administration cannot be overemphasized. This is so given 
the dominant involvement of corporate governance breach in most of the corporate failures witnessed since the 
1990s and as recently experienced in the banking sector in Nigeria. The importance of corporate governance is 
further highlighted by the adoption of corporate governance codes by nearly every country. Also, these codes are 
frequently revised to keep them contemporary and suited to meet the demands of corporate environment. The 
absence of a universal corporate governance code applicable in all countries has posed some challenges. 
Countries have their different corporate governance codes created specifically to suit their peculiar purpose. This 
is not surprising given the difference in the corporate environment of different countries. Again, the corporate 
structures in different countries are different. The presence of these peculiar challenges confronting nations in 
their corporate environment must necessarily occasion the presence of different corporate governance codes in 
different countries. 
There are different and peculiar challenges faced by nations in their efforts at fashioning corporate governance 
codes that are effective, actively enforced and dependable. These challenges if not properly handled could derail 
corporate administration and other relevant institutions in the country concerned. The initial challenge in respect 
of corporate governance is that of providing a well-accepted definition for the concept. Different definitions exist 
for the term. However, basically it can be defined as a system of reconciling the interests of all the stakeholders 
of a corporate entity, whether as shareholders, management, suppliers, customers, financiers and society at large. 
A major process of overcoming the challenge is by defining the components of effective corporate governance. 
The common components of effective corporate governance are fairness, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility. However, as a result of the recent financial crisis which occurred in spite of the lessons of past 
corporate failures, such as, Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, etc, and the issuance of revised corporate governance 
codes, it is without doubt certain that enforcement of corporate governance code is a crucial element in corporate 
governance effectiveness. In this article, the problems confronting the country in relation to corporate 
governance application in corporate organizations are examined. Also, suggestions are made for possible reforms 
in the corporate governance sphere. 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANICS  
Corporate governance mechanisms and controls are designed to reduce the inefficiencies that arise from moral 
hazard and adverse selection. There are both internal monitoring systems and external monitoring systems. 
Internal monitoring can be done, for example, by one (or a few) large shareholder(s) in the case of privately held 
companies or a firm belonging to a business group. Furthermore, the various board mechanisms provide for 
internal monitoring. External monitoring of managers' behavior, occurs when an independent third party (e.g. the 
external auditor) attests the accuracy of information provided by management to investors. Stock analysts and 
debt holders may also conduct such external monitoring. An ideal monitoring and control system should regulate 
both motivation and ability, while providing incentive alignment toward corporate goals and objectives. Care 
should be taken that incentives are not so strong that some individuals are tempted to cross lines of ethical 
behavior, for example by manipulating revenue and profit figures to drive the share price of the company up. 
Furthermore, the CBN through its former Governor Sanui Lamido Sanui in Nigeria introduced a corporate 
governance code or principle where no Managing Director or Chief Executive of a commercial bank who have 
spent ten years or more should head the bank and no financial or auditing firm who has audited or consulted for 
the financial institutions for a period of ten years are allowed to audit the financial status of these banks. It is 
important to state that it is novel idea for transparency and accountability but these financial advisers or 
chartered accountants may register a new business name and start to operate in a different corporate entity since 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) does not prohibit an individual from practicing or registering his business 
name for purpose of business registration. The writer is of the view where the corporate profile of the partners 
should be exhibited at its office nationwide and the professional bodies like ICAN, ANAN, CITN, etc.  who 
regulate the practice of accounting and taxation should also be involved if the true nature of corporate 
accountability and governance to checkmate double registration or practice by an individual practitioner who has 
been prohibited from one financial institution to another. 
4. Legal Framework for Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Apart from the main statute regulating corporate organizations in the country, that is, the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act, there are several corporate governance codes in force; some of them are industry specific. The law 
has also been seen as an element in governance and the idea that governance is a non-statutory regime. For 
instance in the United Kingdom(UK) where the listed or quoted company comply or explain regime applies 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.26, 2014 
 
40 
under the United Kingdom corporate Governance Code is a myth. The corporate governance codes applicable in 
the country are the Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria 2003,  which was issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission; the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post-
Consolidation 2006, which was issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria; the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Licensed Pensions Operators 2008, which was issued by the Pension Commission; and the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Insurance Industry in Nigeria 2009, which was issued by the National Insurance Commission, 
The 2003 SEC Code is currently being reviewed by the Security and Exchange Commission. In fact, a draft 
Revised Code of Corporate Governance has been exposed to the public by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission since last year as initial steps toward the finalization of the Revised Corporate Governance Code. 
As can be gleaned from the above; there is a multiplicity of corporate governance codes in Nigeria. There is a 
specialized court in Nigeria that prosecutes securities matters involving stockbrokers, firms as well as individuals 
known as Investment Security Tribunal(IST) sitting in major commercial cities in Nigeria such Lagos, Abuja, 
kano, Enugu just to mention but a few. This is a novel idea to reduce the delay in federal high courts and fast 
track cases on stock dealings to bring back the investors’ confidence in our jurisdiction and to boost the 
economy. 
(i) Benefits of Corporate Governance Codes 
The heightened awareness of effective corporate governance is not without justification. A well-implemented 
corporate governance regime has tremendous benefits to all stakeholders. 
These benefits are the endearing attributes of corporate governance. In the first place, it is unarguable that an 
effective corporate governance mechanism, backed up with adequate monitoring and enforcement regime, would 
build investors confidence, eliminate financial scandals and curb corporate failures. Also, it has the potential of 
raising the standards of performance and driving reforms for corporate growth and achievement. It readily 
provides an assessment framework for corporate bodies. In that wise, it facilitates peer and sectorial comparison 
and analysis. Furthermore, it forms the basis for corporate governance codes for companies. 
In a nutshell, therefore, it is certain that corporate governance codes promote efficiency in the use of corporate 
assets, assist corporate bodies in attracting low-cost capital, ensure overall positive corporate performance and 
the ability to meet societal expectations. 
(ii) Issues about Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
There are several issues that have arisen in the course of the implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
These issues have had the effect of adversely impacting on the realization of the whole benefits realizable from 
corporate governance code implementation. 
a) Multiplicity of codes: There are too many corporate governance codes in the country. As previously 
observed, there are presently four corporate governance codes of which three are industry specific and 
one applicable to all public companies. While it can be argued that the multiplicity of codes enable 
particular industries to fashion out a corporate governance code suited to the peculiar needs and 
requirements of the industries concerned, the multiplicity of corporate governance codes could occasion 
confusion, hardship and uncertainty. Corporate governance rules are basic principles that are applicable 
to organizations. Thus, the   justification   for   multiplicity   of   corporate   governance   codes   
becomes insubstantial.  In fact, the multiplicity of corporate governance codes in the country is 
attributable to the inadequacies of the 2003 SEC Code which is now non-contemporary vis-a-vis 
corporate governance developments and practice.  
b) Independent directors: The corporate governance codes have provisions relating to independent 
directors. However, it is doubtful if the drafters of the different codes had a full understanding of that 
specie of directors in the course of drafting the codes. In the first place, there is no uniformity of 
definition of an independent director.  In  fact,,  some codes just stipulate that independent directors are 
to be appointed by organization within the purview of the code, but did not define who an independent 
director is.8 In addition, it is clear that the role to be played by independent director is either not fully 
appreciated or grossly ignored. For example, the global trend is to have a majority of the directors on 
the board of directors to be independent directors.9 In Nigeria, the situation is different. In some codes 
the independent directors are to be not more than If independent directors are not in the majority on the 
board, they would be ineffective in playing the crucial balancing role expected of them. An independent 
director is that director who is independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship that could materially interfere with, or could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere 
with, the exercise of his unfettered and independent judgment. Another area of defect in relation to the 
provisions of the corporate governance codes on independent director is in relation to their roles. Some 
codes did stipulate some roles for independent directors, but these stipulations are weak and 
inconsequential. The global trend is to have the independent directors to constitute the entirety or 
majority of key corporate governance committees, such as, audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees of companies. 
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c) Audit committee: The audit committee is a vital board committee as far as corporate governance is 
concerned. However, the CAMA has confused its composition by the stipulation that its membership 
should consist of equal number of the representatives of directors and shareholders. The consequence of 
shareholders membership of the audit committee is that some companies have a Board audit committee 
different from the CAMA stipulated audit committee. The key responsibilities of audit committee as 
stipulated in the CAMA are then referred to the Board audit committee while the CAMA audit 
committee merely "approves" quarterly results already approved by the Board on the recommendation 
of the Board audit committee and discusses other inconsequential matters brought to their attention. In 
effect, the CAMA audit committee has become ineffective and irrelevant, except to the extent that it 
affords some shareholders, who are members of the committee, an opportunity to have assured access to 
the directors of the companies in which they are members of their audit committees. The confusion 
concerning audit committees is further compounded by inconsistent stipulations in corporate 
governance codes concerning their chairmanship. 
 
While some codes provide that the chairman of audit committee should be a board member some others 
stipulate that the audit committee should be chaired by a shareholders' representative. Surprisingly, the 
draft Revised Code is silent on what category of membership should produce the chairman of an audit 
committee in spite of the fact that it has some roles specifically assigned to the chairman of an audit 
committee. This audit committee is only applicable to public companies that are quoted at the Nigeria 
Stock Exchange (NSE). 
 
d) Openness and transparency: It is regrettable to note that shareholders are still substantially left in the 
dark in the administration of their companies. The annual reports and accounts of companies do not 
contain sufficient information to keep shareholders adequately informed about their companies. It is 
obvious that the statutory stipulation concerning the contents of annual reports and accounts are no 
longer contemporary. Arising from the complex nature of company administration, advancement in 
technology and global best practice, annual reports issued by Nigerian companies to their shareholders 
have insufficient contents. There is the yawning absence of key reports which are consistent with 
international best practice. Examples of such reports are corporate governance reports, sustainability 
reports, and remuneration reports, It is noteworthy that the draft Revised Code has provisions for such 
reports. 
 
e) Disclosure obligations: Beyond the disclosure made in the annual reports of companies as stipulated 
by the CAMA, there is a real need to take further steps to ensure that shareholders actually get 
necessary corporate information. The information could be provided in a dedicated corporate 
governance section in a company's website. The corporate governance report or section of the annual 
report should contain appropriate website references and links to enable shareholders to access the 
information.  In the case of companies without websites, which is most certainly an aberration in these 
times, such companies should be willing and able to provide such information by email or through the 
post, in a timely manner. 
 
 
f) Role of shareholders' associations and institutional investors: In other jurisdictions, institutional 
investors play active role in ensuring that companies operate within the ambits of good corporate 
governance practices.   Unfortunately, institutional investors are rather somnolent in Nigeria. This 
rather unfortunate situation perhaps stems from the fact that they are not under strict and rigorous 
scrutiny from the owners of the funds they manage. The ignorance and complete freehand commonly 
granted institutional investors by the owners of the fund have made institutional investors too 
uninvolved in the administration of the companies in which they have invested other people's funds. 
As for the shareholders' associations, it is noted that some of them are exhibiting commendable activism 
in shareholders' education, training and involvement, though there is still so much room for 
improvement. 
g) Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission: The Securities and Exchange Commission as an 
apex regulatory body that deals on securities and derivates of equity has enormous responsibility in the 
entrenchment of good corporate governance practice in the country. It is on record that the first 
corporate governance code applicable in the country was the brain-child of the Commission. Also, the 
Commission is in the process of revising the 2003 SEC Code. However, beyond the making of 
corporate governance codes, the Commission has other incidental responsibilities. First, it must 
strengthen its monitoring, enforcement and compliance unit. Of what use is the corporate governance 
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code if it is neither complied with nor enforced by the regulator? Experience has shown that compliance 
with regulations is boosted through enforcement of same through some form of sanction, including 
"naming and shaming" of violators. More manpower may be needed by the Commission to undertake 
this huge but necessary responsibility. Secondly, the Commission should be actively engaged in 
awareness drives, including training and retraining of all stakeholders in the corporate governance 
domain. These must be regular, sustained and widespread. Thirdly, it seems now necessary to formally 
institute corporate governance audit for all public companies. In this connection, the Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators of Nigeria, as the custodian of corporate governance practice 
in country, would readily be available to render whatever services that may be necessary in that regard. 
Fourthly, as an encouragement to those companies that are compliant with the tenets of good corporate 
governance, it may be necessary to institute a annual corporate governance award to deserving 
corporate bodies; something akin to the Annual President's Award of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, In 
the alternative, strong corporate governance compliance should be fully and formally crafted into the 
criteria for the eventual selection of winners of the said President's Award. Fifthly, the Commission 
should pay closer attention to the setting up, functioning and involvement of the key corporate 
governance committees of the board in corporate administration. It is not enough for companies to 
report the existence of these committees in their annual reports and accounts. The Commission should 
set up a structure to ensure that it is furnished with advance notification of the dates of meetings of 
these committees and to occasionally attend such meetings. It should also formalize the process of 
receiving the agenda and minutes of such committee meetings, especially the audit committee, which 
arguably is the most crucial and tasking of the board committees. Sixthly, the Commission should 
prepare and make available on its website, for download by those requiring them, templates and 
specimen of reports, guides and manuals necessary for good corporate governance practice by corporate 
bodies. Finally on the role of the Commission, it is important that the corporate governance code is 
regularly and frequently reviewed and with speed too. The last corporate governance code issued by the 
Commission was in 2003; some odd seven years ago! The tremendous corporate growth experienced in 
the country since then is better left to the imagination. It is arguable that the inadequacies of the 2003 
SEC Code has led to the multiplicity of corporate governance codes in the country. The regulators of 
the specific industries concerned felt a need for a more robust corporate governance code than the 
Commission has offered and had to issue theirs to regulate companies operating in their specific 
industries. The Commission must be more active in corporate governance code reviews. It is noted that 
the attempt to review the 2003 SEC Code which commenced in 2008 through the inauguration of the 
National Committee for the Review of the Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
2003 is yet to be concluded, about three years after the inauguration of the committee. However, the 
present SEC DG, Ms Oteh has initiated the basic principles of code of practice for stockbrokers and 
firms who are trading on the floor of the stock market that it is no longer business as usual, thereby 
bringing back the investors’ interest and stakeholders trust in the Nigeria stock market where erring 
firms are sanctioned and their respective licensees withdrawn..  
 
5. THE CHALLENGES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. 
 
• Demand for information: In order to influence the directors, the shareholders must combine with 
others to form a voting group which can pose a real threat of carrying resolutions or appointing 
directors at a general meeting. 
• Monitoring costs: A barrier to shareholders using good information is the cost of processing it, 
especially to a small shareholder. The traditional answer to this problem is the efficient market 
hypothesis (in finance, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are 
efficient), which suggests that the small shareholder will free ride on the judgments of larger 
professional investors. 
• Supply of accounting information: Financial accounts form a crucial link in enabling providers of 
finance to monitor directors. Imperfections in the financial reporting process will cause 
imperfections in the effectiveness of corporate governance. This should, ideally, be corrected by 
the working of the external auditing process. 
 
6. Conclusion: 
Good corporate governance practice is now a sine qua non in corporate administration as a result of its 
huge benefits to companies, its shareholders and other stakeholders. The challenge therefore is to ensure 
that the system is constantly monitored, sufficiently tweaked and regularly updated to ensure that the 
corporate governance codes are contemporary, relevant and reliable. Beyond the CAMA, there is the 
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need to have corporate governance codes to regulate companies. It may be thought that if corporate 
governance codes are so beneficial that they should be extended to private companies. This argument is 
supported by the fact that private companies existing in those industries with their specific corporate 
governance codes are not exempted from complying with those codes. Nevertheless, it seems not 
appropriate at the moment to extend the coverage of corporate governance codes to private companies 
because, quite frankly, it can be expensive to comply with the provisions of corporate governance 
codes, especially for incorporated small family businesses which do not need such exposure in view of 
their restricted ownership and/or business dealings. The regulators, especially the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, have a huge role to play in the sanitation of the corporate governance 
environment in the country. Also, shareholders' association and institutional investors should get more 
interested and involved in corporate administration as well as professional bodies. This will encourage 
social justice and serves them better to do so to protect the corporate image and governance. 
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